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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1135 
____________ 
 
ZONG LUAN OUYANG, 
a/k/ Philip Chi Ho Mak, 
 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
     Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A097-332-148) 
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy 
__________________________________ 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 15, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: August 20, 2012) 
 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Zong Luan Ouyang (“Ouyang”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
Ouyang, a native and citizen of China, was placed in removal proceedings in 
March, 2005 after being denied admission into the United States.  An Immigration Judge 
in Chicago sustained three charges against him, including one under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an alien who attempted to enter the United States without a valid 
entry document.  Venue eventually was changed to Newark, New Jersey, and Ouyang 
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 
Torture, claiming persecution on the basis of his opposition to China’s coercive 
population control policies.  After a merits hearing on March 29, 2006, the Immigration 
Judge denied relief, and ordered Ouyang removed to China.  On July 24, 2007, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals affirmed and dismissed his appeal.  Ouyang did not petition for 
review of this decision. 
 On August 8, 2011, Ouyang filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings with 
the Board in order to re-apply for asylum.  He argued that he was exempt from the time 
requirement for filing a motion to reopen in light of “changed circumstances, ” that is, his 
conversion to Christianity and baptism on January 3, 2011.  Ouyang asserted that he now 
attends a Methodist church in Brooklyn, and he claimed in his motion to reopen that he 
would be persecuted in China on the basis of his religious beliefs because he would find 
it necessary to attend an underground church.  Ouyang was born in Fujian Province.  He 
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asserted that government-sanctioned churches are “merely mouthpieces for the Chinese 
Communist Party,” A.R. 35, and conditions have worsened for Christians in China since 
the time of his merits hearing in 2006.  Ouyang submitted evidence of the sincerity of his 
beliefs.  He also submitted the 2010 State Department International Religious Freedom 
Report, and he submitted a number of articles as evidence of persecution by the Chinese 
government of Christians who attend unregistered churches.   
 On December 21, 2011, the Board denied the motion to reopen as untimely filed.  
The Board concluded that Ouyang failed to show a material change in conditions in 
China sufficient to warrant an exemption to the timeliness requirement.  The Board 
specifically observed that the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report states that the 
Chinese government continues to engage in systematic and egregious violations of 
freedom of religion, but concluded that this was a continuation of a longstanding practice 
and not a change for purposes of reopening.  Enforcement also varied widely by region, 
and Ouyang had no support for his assertion that enforcement efforts in Fujian Province 
rose to the level of persecution.  The Board also noted that there was no evidence that 
Chinese authorities were aware of Ouyang’s conversion, likely to become aware of it, or 
likely to have any interest in harming him because of it.  Therefore, he was not prima 
facie eligible for asylum.  The Board further declined to exercise its sua sponte authority 
to reopen proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). 
 Ouyang has timely petitioned for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a), (b)(1), except that we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision declining 
to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings.  See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 
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320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  Ouyang’s motion in this Court to stay removal 
previously was denied. 
 We will deny the petition for review.  We review the Board’s denial of a motion to 
reopen for an abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 
U.S. 94, 105 (1988).  Under this deferential standard of review, we will not overturn the 
Board’s decision unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.  See Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F. 3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).  We uphold the Board’s factual 
determinations underlying the denial of the motion to reopen if they are “‘supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’”  
Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).  Put another way, such 
determinations must be upheld unless the evidence presented would compel a reasonable 
factfinder to reach a contrary result.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Guo
A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the 
final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”  8 
C.F.R.§ 1003.2(c)(2).  Ouyang’s motion was filed almost 4 years late.  However, the time 
limitation for a motion to reopen does not apply where the alien seeks to “apply or 
reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising 
in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if 
such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or 
presented at the previous hearing,” 
, 386 F.3d at 561. 
id. at 1003. 2(c)(3)(ii).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  An alien may file a successive asylum application based on changed 
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personal circumstances or changed country conditions, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(a)(2)(D), at any time during proceedings before the entry of a final order of 
removal, or within the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen.  Outside of those 
circumstances, changed country conditions under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) must be 
shown.  Liu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.
The Board’s findings concerning Ouyang’s country conditions evidence are 
supported by substantial evidence, 
, 555 F.3d 145, 150-52 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Zheng, 549 F.3d at 266; Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 
48.  Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ouyang did not 
qualify for the changed country conditions exception to the time requirement for filing a 
motion to reopen, see Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105; Guo, 386 F.3d at 562.  Ouyang was 
required to show that country conditions have worsened since the time of his hearing 
before the Immigration Judge in 2006.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Ouyang’s evidence 
does not show a material change in conditions in China since that date.  For example, the 
2010 International Religious Freedom Report indicates that Chinese officials continue to 
scrutinize and in some cases harass underground churches, but there is no evidence that 
China’s history of official repression of non-government sponsored Christian churches 
has worsened since Ouyang’s removal hearing in 2006.  Moreover, Ouyang’s recent 
conversion to Christianity merely establishes that his personal circumstances have 
changed.  Changed personal circumstances are insufficient to excuse an alien from the 
90-day time limit on a motion to reopen.  Liu
In his brief on appeal, Ouyang contends that the Board failed to consider all of his 
evidence, and failed to give sufficient weight to his favorable evidence.  (Petitioner’s 
, 555 F.3d at 150-52. 
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Brief, at 13.)  Specifically, he argues that the Board failed to consider: (1) the Annual 
Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom from May 
2010; (2) an article titled “China: Forced Outdoors” from persecution.com; (3) an article 
titled “China: Persecution Worsening” from persecution.com; (4) a New York Times 
article titled “Chinese Christians Barred from Conference,” and (5) an article from The 
Christian Post titled “Watchdog Sees Rise in Reported Persecution Cases in China.”  See 
id.  These other items, Ouyang asserts, show a worsening of conditions in China with 
respect to religious persecution in 2008, 2009, and 2010.  See id.
In 
 at 13-16. 
Zheng
We have reviewed Ouyang’s motion to reopen and we are satisfied that the Board 
considered all of his evidence.  As to the Board’s weighing of the evidence in his case, 
we decide only whether a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to reach a contrary 
result.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 
, 549 F.3d 260, we held that the Board failed adequately to consider a 
Chinese national’s evidence regarding changed circumstances in China.  In Ouyang’s 
case, the Board noted that various articles and media reports had been submitted but 
criticized Ouyang for failing to discuss the relevance of several of the items or for 
including only portions of the items, thus making it difficult to evaluate them.  The Board 
noted Ouyang’s citation to his Tabs W, AA, CC, and DD, but held that a general 
reference to a document is insufficient to explain the materiality of it.  Moreover, the 
2010 Report, which Ouyang also submitted, showed only a continuation of China’s 
repression of religion.  The Board further noted that Tabs Z, AA, CC, and DD did not 
relate specifically to Fujian province.   
Guo, 386 F.3d at 561.  On this administrative record, 
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and even considering the specific items Ouyang has identified in his brief, we conclude 
that no reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find that there has been a material 
worsening since 2006 of China’s repression of unregistered Christian churches.  
Accordingly, the Board’s determination that Ouyang’s motion to reopen was untimely 
filed was not an abuse of discretion.1
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
 
 
                                              
1 Because the motion to reopen was untimely filed, we find it unnecessary to reach the 
Board’s alternate determination that Ouyang failed to establish prima facie eligibility for 
asylum. 
